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Chapter 21
Conclusion: The Japanese Situation

The Japanese electricity industry is currently being gradually
deregulated in the hopes that high electricity prices can be reduced.
At the same time the government is keen to encourage more use of
nuclear power. It is aiming to reuse nuclear fuel in order to close
the nuclear fuel cycle and thereby
reduce Japan’s reliance on imports
to fuel electricity generation.1
However deregulation
in other
parts of the world has not brought prices down, nor has it been
conducive to investment in nuclear power. More importantly, the
competitive pressures encouraged by deregulation do not encourage
reliability and safety, issues which are very important to the
Japanese people, particularly in the wake of a series of nuclear
accidents over the past decade.

HISTORY
During the early part of the 20th Century some 700 electricity
companies were set up in Japan. These were merged after the first
world war into just five. During the second world war the government
combined these five into one generating company, Nihon Hassoden KK,
and nine distribution companies. Electricity infrastructure was badly
damaged during the war but electricity production accelerated again
after the war.2
In 1951, whilst still under American occupation, Japan’s electricity
industry was reorganised according to the US model of state-regulated
privately-owned monopoly utilities. The country was divided into nine
regions and in each region a single privately-owned utility was given
a monopoly to supply electricity. (In 1972, when Okinawa was returned
to Japan, the number of general electric utilities (GEUs) was
increased to ten.) These GEUs are vertically integrated to include
generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply. They are:
•

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,

•

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., and
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Okinawa Electric Power Co., Inc.

Tokyo Electric Power, which includes Tokyo in its region of supply,
serves 24 million customers and is the world’s largest privatelyowned electric utility and one of Japan’s most profitable companies.3
The generation of wholesale electricity in Japan is mainly done by
the GEUs (75%) but it is supplemented by other electricity
generators, referred to as wholesale electric utilites (see Figure
21.1). The largest is the Electric Power Development Company or JPower, which was created in 1952 by the government to augment
electricity supplies nation-wide at a time when the GEUs did not have
the financial capacity to meet electricity demand. It is government
owned and funded and builds transmission
lines as well as power
stations. It operates 67 power stations. 4
The other major wholesale utility is Japan Atomic Power Co (JAPC) was
created in 1957 as a joint venture of the GEUs, J-Power and industry
interests, to promote the commercialisation of nuclear energy and
import nuclear reactors. It owns four of the nation’s
52 power
stations (one of which is no longer in operation).5 In addition
thermal power plants were built ‘‘during the postwar high-growth
period’’ as joint ventures between GEUs, steel makers and other
industrial users. Municipal governments also operate
their own
generating plants, particularly hydroelectric plants.6
Figure 21.1 Generating Capacity by Ownership - 1994

In-house
Generation
10%
Wholesale Electric
Utilities
12%

Specified Supply
Projects
3%

General Electric
Utilities
75%

Source of data: Kibune, Hisabe. ‘Regulatory Reform and Its Effect in the Japanese
Electric Utility Industry.' Economic Analysis Series(142). December 1995: 89-122,
p. 93.

In 1994 GEUs supplied 90 percent of the nation’s retail electricity
market. Ten percent was supplied by in-house power producers. These
are paper and pulp, chemical, steel and oil refining industries that
generate their own electricity, often with steam that is a by-product
of their manufacturing processes. Industrial users generated about 28
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percent of their own electricity requirements as a way of keeping
their costs down.7
Specified Supply Projects supply about 3 percent of electricity
directly to particular customers. These include municipal councils
supplying their own departments, companies supplying electricity for
housing or buildings
they own, and electricity supply from one
company to another with a close relationship.8
Until 1995 the industry was closely regulated, under the Electric
Utility Industry Law (1964) by the Public Utilities Department of the
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy. This regulation was supposed
to protect the public interest; to guard national security; to
prevent pollution;
to promote adequate development of the
electricity sector; to ensure that the private GEU’s did not take
advantage of their monopoly position to extort consumers, and to
ensure safety. Although the regulations did not guarantee monopolies
to GEUs the rules required that, before it could be licensed, a GEU
had to show that it could supply enough capacity to meet demand in an
area and not duplicate existing capacity. This essentially prevented
the establishment of competing utilities within each region. 9
GEUs, in turn, were obliged to meet demand at rates that had to be
approved by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
This rate was based on cost of production plus a fair rate of return,
as was the case for US electricity utilities. The ten companies
cooperated to ensure that demand could be met, by exchanging
and
supplying each other with electricity in times of need. The regional
grids were linked by interconnections to facilitate this. The GEUs
also cooperated on research
and development of new technologies and
systems of procurement.10
Japan has little in the way of indigenous resources for generating
electricity, apart from hydroelectric power, and is therefore very
dependent on imports. As can be seen from Figure 21.2 below, the main
sources of electricity until the 1970s were oil, coal and
hydroelectricity. Japan relied mainly on hydroelectric power until
the 1950s when the use of oil expanded because at the time it was
cheap and oil power stations could be built quickly to keep up with
post-war growth. Oil supplied a peak of 74% of electricity in
1973
when the first oil crisis hit but declined rapidly after that.11
As a result of the oil crises of the 1970s, oil became an expensive
fuel source and Japan sought to diversify its sources of electricity,
relying more on nuclear energy and liquid natural gas (LNG). All the
GEC’s except Okinawa Electric Power Company constructed nuclear
facilities. Today, hydroelectric power, nuclear power, coal and
natural gas are used for base load and mid-range load whilst oil is
used for peak loads together with pumped storage hydroelectric
power.12
The 52 existing nuclear rectors operating in Japan supply one third
of the nation’s electricity, giving it the third largest stock of
nuclear power plants
in the world, after the US and rapidly catching
up with France.13 It is predicted nuclear power will provide 41% of
Japan’s electricity by 2012, (see Figure 21.2). Three more reactors
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Figure 21.2 Composition Ratio of Generated Electricity by Fuel in
Japan
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* ProjectedSource of data: ‘Electricity Review Japan.’ The Federation of Electric
Power
Companies of Japan, 2004 http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/erj/erj2003-2004.pdf, p. 8.

NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
The government goal of more nuclear power is despite widespread
public opposition to nuclear power. A series of nuclear accidents and
cover-ups have raised public concerns about nuclear power (see Table
21.1).
#

Table 21.1 Accidents and Revelations of Mismanagement in the
Industry
1995-2004
Year

Place

Owner

Incident

1995

Monju fastbreeder reactor
prototype
Tokaimura fuel
reprocessing

PNC

Massive coolant
leak

PNC

Fire and
explosion

1997

Radiation
Exposure

Scal
e
*

Status
still
closed

37 workers

3

closed
3
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1997
1997

1999

plant
Tokaimura
uranium fuel
production
plant
Fugen advanced
thermal reactor
Tokaimura
radioactive
waste storage
facility
Tsuraga nuclear
power plant
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years
PNC

PNC
PNC

JAPC

1999

Tokaimura
uranium
processing
plant

JCO

2000

Fugen advanced
thermal reactor

JNC

2000
2000
2001
2002
2002

2002

2003

2004

2004
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False alarm
warning that
fuel reached
critical mass
Radioactive
tritium leaked
Revelations of
low-level
radiation leaks
over 30 years
Worst ever
radioactive
coolant leak
uncontrolled
nuclear chain
reaction

Controlling rods
in incorrect
position
Controlling rod
malfunction

?

11 workers

?

temp.
closur
e

na

1
>600 people
2 workers
die
300,000
residents
ordered to
stay
indoors

4

?

temp.
closur
e
still
closed

temp.
closur
e
Joyo
JNC
?
temp.
experimental
closur
reactor
e
Mihama nuclear
KEPCO
Cracked pipe,
1
temp.
power plant
coolant leak
closur
e
Hamaoka nuclear
CEPCO
2 unrelated
1
temp.
power plant
radioactive
closur
leaks
e
Fukuishima
TEPCO
Core shroud
1
temp.
Daiichi nuclear
cracks
closur
power plant
e
Tokyo Electric
TEPCO
Admits it
na
temp.
Power Company
falsified data
closur
on maintenance
e of
checks
all
reacto
r
For a full list of incidents during 2003 see Citizens Nuclear
Information Centre (CNIC) at
http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit95/nit95articles/nit95significan
t.html
For a full list of incidents during 2003 see Citizens Nuclear
Information Centre (CNIC) at
http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit101/nit101articles/nit101siginc.
html
Tsuruga nuclear
JAPC
Workers sprayed
8 workers
?
power plant
with
contaminated
water
Mihama nuclear
KEPCO
Burst pipe
5 workers
0+
temp.
power plant
containing highkilled
closur
pressure steam
6 in
e
hospital
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* International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) - from 0 to 7 (Chernobyl=7, Three Mile
Island=5)
# Technically only an event of 4 to 7 is an accident, the others are incidents
PNC = government-owned Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp or Donen
JNC = Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, a reformed version of PNC
JCO = private company, wholly owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Co Ltd.
CEPCO = Chubu Electric Power Co.
TEPCO = Tokyo Electric Power Co.
KEPCO = Kansai Electric Power Co.
Source of data: Robert Chesal and Tim Fisher. ‘Japan's Nuclear Neglect.' Radio
Netherlands 10 August 2004. http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/jap040810.html; Jon
Choy. ‘Deregulation Jolting Japan's Energy Sector.' JEI Report(33). 29 August 1997.
http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR97/9733f.html;
‘Chronology - Mishaps at Japan Nuclear Facilities.' World Environment News 1
October 1999. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=3944;
‘Japan Shuts Reactor as Precaution against Leaks.' World Environment News 15
November 2001. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=13307;
‘Japan Utility Says Nuke Reactor Had Crack in Pipe.' World Environment News 11
April 2000. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=6336;
‘Japan's Tepco Sees Better Year after Safety Scandal.' World Environment News 19
May 2004. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=25159;
‘Two Japan Nuclear Reactors Malfuntion but No Leak.' World Environment News 5 April
2000. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=6259;
Philip White. ‘Five Killed in Mihama-3 Accident.' Nuke Info Tokyo September/October
2004. http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit102/nit102articles/nit102mihama.html;
Miho Yoshikawa. ‘Accident a Threat to Japan Nuclear Programme.' World Environment
News 5 October 1999.
http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=3990.

There were efforts to cover up several of these incidents or lessen
their perceived extent.
The operators of the Monju fast-breeder
reactor edited videotapes of the leak to cover up the extent of the
accident but this became public and did nothing to reassure the
public. Managers at the Tokaimura fuel reprocessing plant, where 37
people were exposed to radiation, ‘‘coerced workers into telling a
consistent but false timeline of events’’. In addition there were
revelations about the poor safety measures undertaken at the centre.15
In 2002 Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) admitted that had not
accurately
reported damage to its nuclear power plants for some
years.16
The first incident involved hiding cracks in the reactor
shroud. This was followed by the discovery that Tokyo
Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) had also found cracks in the
recirculation piping system, but had failed to report them.
Then, there was the cover-up of the results
of the leak rate
17
inspection test for the containment vessel…
Poor inspection methods and negligence have also been blamed for some
of these accidents such as the latest at Mihama power plant which
involved a pipe installed in 1976 and not inspected since, despite
warnings about it some months before the accident. Other pipes in the
plant, including
those in more critical areas, have also gone
uninspected.18
In 1998 the government agency Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corp (PNC), which was under fire for its mismanagement of
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nuclear facilities, was replaced with the Japan Nuclear Cycle
Development Institute (JNC). JNC is now responsible for nuclear
research and development in the field of fast-breeder reactors, highlevel radioactive waste disposal and spent fuel reprocessing.19
In response to growing public concern about nuclear power, the power
companies created a Panel for Restoring Confidence made up of the
presidents of
the 10 GEUs, the JAPC, the EPDC and Japan Nuclear Fuel
Ltd (JNFL).20 One of the more recent arguments made for nuclear power
has been that it aids Japan to meet its Kyoto commitments, however no
solution has yet been found for disposing of nuclear waste and the
government’s efforts to close the nuclear cycle by recycling used
uranium into plutonium has been less than successful.
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NUMO) was formed in 2000
to solve problems associated with disposal of high-level radioactive
waste. Japan had been sending its waste to Europe for reprocessing
and importing back the reprocessed waste---which is stored---and mixed
oxide fuel (MOX), a combination of uranium and plutonium oxides. The
government has invested billions of dollars in developing its own
reprocessing plant. However there have been a number of scandals over
MOX, including the discovery in 1999 that MOX fuel rods arriving in
Japan from British Nuclear Fuels Ltd had not been properly inspected
and the data on them had been falsified.
In addition, Japanese
efforts to process and use plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in
fast-breeder reactors have not been successful so far and have
involved various accidents (see Table 21.1). This has all added to
public concern about Japan’s nuclear program.21

THE IMPETUS FOR DEREGULATION
Several factors have contributed to the high cost of electricity in
Japan. The first is the high cost of nuclear power, which, as we saw
in previous chapters, requires very high initial investments. In
Japan, as elsewhere, nuclear accidents have caused the public to be
wary of nuclear power plants and to oppose their location near urban
areas. This means that they have
to be sited remotely and this adds
22
In addition, long lead times are
to the transmission costs.
lengthened even further by approval processes designed to ensure
safety and reassure the public.
The GEUs have also spent much more on pollution control, maintenance
and avoiding blackouts than companies in other parts of 23the world,
especially deregulated companies in the US and Britain.
Avoiding
blackouts is particularly expensive as Japan suffers from fluctuating
electricity usage because of rising usage of electricity-hungry airconditioning and heating that peaks in mid-summer and mid-winter.
Because peak usage is so much higher than other times, some power
plants are
only used for a short time each day at certain times of
24
the year.
By the 1990s the rising yen mean that Japanese businesses,
particularly manufacturing companies, were finding it hard to compete
with foreign companies on international markets and they blamed high
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electricity prices for contributing to this situation.25 However Hisao
Kibune of the Department of Economics at Nagoya-Gakuin University
notes that in in the period 1980-1993 Japanese electricity rates
decreased by 13% whilst those in Western countries went up by 30-80%
and when compared with the general cost of living in Japan,
electricity
rates were still falling in the early 1990s (see Figure
21.4).26 In part this was achieved because rates reached an all time
high following the oil crises in
the 1970s, and subsequently dropped
as oil prices went down again.27 Similarly, The Economist stated in
1995 that ‘‘On a purchasing-power28 basis, Japanese electricity prices
compare well internationally.’’
Nevertheless, the story that
Japanese electricity costs are much higher than the rest of the world
helped to promote the case for deregulation.
Additionally, companies found that they were able to produce
electricity in-house at a cheaper rate that that charged by the GEUs.
This was because fuel costs were declining due to the high yen, and
in-house generation was not as capital-intensive as the nuclear power
plants that the GEUs depended on. Additionally GEUs had to factor
into their rates other costs such as transmission and distribution
costs. Nevertheless it led Japanese business leaders to believe that
deregulation would help lower costs. They claimed that the cost plus
fair return did not provide incentives to reduce costs and increase
efficiency in the way that competition would. They argued that
competition
would
encourage
more
decentralised
smaller
scale
electricity generating technologies to be developed. They also
believed that safety regulations could be scaled back in a
deregulated system, which would also save money.29
Deregulation was also driven in part by what has been called the
‘‘winds of deregulation’’ which were blowing worldwide as we have
Today Japan ‘‘considers
seen in earlier chapters of this book.30
deregulation a key to future economic success’’.31 This view has been
encouraged by nations like the US that see business opportunities for
their own corporations. For example, the US Trade Representative in
2000, Charlene Barshefsky, stated that deregulation measures in
Japan,
achieved
under
the
US-Japan
Enhanced
Initiative
on
Deregulation
and
Competition
Policy,
‘‘will
translate
into
substantial gains for U.S. firms doing business in Japan’’ because
lucrative markets would be opened to these US firms. She claimed that
Japanese consumers would also benefit from the lower prices, greater
choice and increased innovation that would result. With respect to
electricity, ‘‘US firms would be able to produce, sell, and trade
power in Japan’s $135 billion electric power market’’ and the lower
electricity prices that would ensue would increase economic growth
and create thousands of new jobs.32 All promises familiar to readers
of this book from those who advocate deregulation but promises that
have consistently failed to materialise in the real world of
electricity deregulation.

DEREGULATION
Deregulation in Japan has been fairly gradual. The first step towards
deregulation, via amendments to the Electricity Utility Law in 1995,
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was to allow the GEUs to buy electricity from outside sources
including company in-house generators that generated more electricity
than they needed and independent power producers (IPPs). A system of
competitive tendering
was introduced and approval conditions eased to
facilitate this.33 It was expected this would enable the GEUs to meet
peak demand without building new capital-intensive power plants and
to introduce competition into the wholesale electricity market.
Additionally the utilities could seek tenders for construction of 34new
power plants from a wider range of firms, including foreign firms.
This was not a very satisfactory situation for newcomers to the
market who were expected to compete with well-established GEUs by
selling cheaper electricity to them. They could expect sales to be
mainly at peak periods. This did not offer much of an incentive to
invest in new generating plant, so the new IPPs derive their power
from surplus power from in-house generators.35
A further amendment to the Law in 1999 meant that from 2000 any
electricity company could compete to supply customers using more than
2MW of electricity (see Figure 21.3). This amounted to just under one
third of the market (30%). Electricity rates for these large
customers were deregulated and transmission lines were opened up for
access by third parties, although the GEUs that owned them still set
the rates and conditions of their use. GEUs were still obliged to
meet the energy demand of other consumers and to supply electricity
to the contestable customers
if the new companies failed or had a
shortfall in their supply.36
Figure 21.3 Electricity Supply System in 2000

GEUs
Generation

Power
Plants

Wholesale
Electricity
Utilities

Independent
Power
Producers
IPPs

Power
Producer &
Suppliers
PPSs

Specified
Supply
Projects

=new features
Transmission
Distribution

Retail
Supply

Transmission Lines

Distribution Lines

Small Customers

Large customers

Special
customers

Adapted from: Toshihiko Furuya. Deregulation of the Electric Power Industry in
Japan.
Washington: Tokyo Electric Power Company. http://www.wnfm.com/
2001%20Annual%20Meeting%20PPT/Toshihiko%20Furuya%20Presentation.pdf

The GEUs were also now able to supply large customers in other
regions but there was little competition between GEUs in this way.37
The GEUs can also invest in other industries, as their counterparts
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in Europe and US can. The market was opened to electricity traders--companies like Enron---that
buy
and
sell
electricity
but
don’t
necessarily produce it.38 Nevertheless, Masanori Maruo, a utilities
analyst with Deutsche Securities foresees that in the long term the
number of utilities will be reduced as competition ‘weeds’ out the
smaller electricity producers.39
Prices did drop after the 1999 amendment came into play but this can
be attributed to lower interest rates, since the price decrease was
for both contestable and uncontestable consumers and there were few
new entrants into the market and ‘‘little revealed competition
between the incumbents’’.40 Also the price drops can be seen as part
of a longer trend of falling prices since the 1980s (see Figure 21.4)
and as a strategy by the GEUs
to undercut potential competitors, even
before they get established.41

Figure 21.4 Average Electricity Prices for all Japanese Utilities
24
22

Yen/kWh

20
18
16
14
12
10
1985

1990

1995

2000

2004

Source of data: Minoru Takahashi. ‘The Current Status of Electric Power Industry
Deregulation in Japan and the Influence of the California Crisis.' Japan and the
World Economy 14,
2002, p. 343; David Pilling. ‘Tepco Pre-Empts Dereguation with Price Cut.’
Financial Times. 1 October 2004, p. 9.

By 2001 there were 41 IPPs and 9 new
entrants to retail supply called
Power Producer & Suppliers (PPSs).42 By the end of 2003 PPSs supplied
less than 1 percent of the market (1.7 percent of the contestable
market) and by October 2004 TEPCO, for instance, had only lost 1
percent of its electricity sales to competitors. Some customers
avoided PPSs because of their inability to promise reliable supply
because they lacked a backup supply in case of emergency.43
Because of the risks involved, newcomers to the market tend to have
backers with deep pockets such as Diamond Power, owned by Mitsubishi,
and Ennet, owned by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT). The only
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PPS proposing to build a major power plant at this stage is a joint
venture of Tokyo Gas and Royal Dutch/Shell. 44
A bill passed in 2003 will enable electricity suppliers to compete
from 2005 for customers using more than 50kW of electricity such as
small and medium businesses and apartment buildings. This means
almost two thirds (63%) of electricity sales will be contestable.
Complete contestability, covering all consumers, is planned for 2007.
An independent
organization will be set up to govern transmission
and distribution,
which will remain in the ownership of the ten
GEUs.45 Currently if two GEUs want to trade power they have to pay
transmission fees to each of the GEUs geographically located
between
them and the price for this is set by the GEUs themselves.46
A Power Exchange will be soon established to facilitate wholesale
trade and price setting. This is welcomed by the large GEUs which see
it as a way of postponing the need to invest in new power plants.47
They may also see an opportunity to use their market power to
influence prices in the way large power companies have done in the US
and Britain. It is also expected that some of Japan’s large trading
companies such as Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui and Marubeni, will
become involved in electricity trading.48

THE FORECAST
Whether householders and small businesses will gain from the
deregulation of retail electricity supply remains to be seen. As we
have seen in the rest of the book, in most places where electricity
was
deregulated,
retail
electricity
prices
increased,
often
dramatically, for households and small businesses. In particular
where a power exchange is in place and there are a number of large
powerful companies market manipulation has taken place and there is
no reason to suppose that Japan will be immune from this phenomenon,
once its power exchange is up and running. Only an excess of supply
would prevent this and it is evident that the rate of investment in
power plants has slowed considerably with deregulation.
Service and reliability have also declined world wide in deregulated,
privatised electricity systems because the service obligations of
regulated electricity companies are replaced by short-term commercial
goals. The emphasis on energy security and reliability, which was
maintained
at a high level by the GEUs, gave way to a concern with
costs.49 According to the International Energy Agency deregulation of
the energy sector in Japan ‘‘has resulted in increasing cost
sensitivity and conflicts between the objectives of 50 economic
efficiency, environmental protection51 and energy security.’’ Capital
investment in the sector has fallen.
The supposed efficiency gains to be made by private, competitive
companies, are usually made through short term cost savings, which
include cutting the quality or level of service rather than offering
the same level of service for less money. Sometimes return on
investment has been increased by charging more for the service. Often
cost savings have been made by lowering rates of pay and conditions

Conclusion

July 31, 2006

Sharon Beder

for workers and making thousands of electricity workers redundant.
Full-time permanent employment
has been increasingly replaced by
part-time and temporary work.52 In this way private enterprises may
seem to be more efficient but the gains to shareholders are at the
expense of workers and consumers, who suffer a decline in service
levels.
Another easy way to cut costs, although short-sighted, is to cut
safety, maintenance, training and research budgets. Old equipment is
not regularly serviced nor replaced in advance of likely failure. As
a result, accidents and equipment-related blackouts increase as do
blackouts related to network congestion because planning and
responsibility for network maintenance and development is not a
market priority.
This is of particular concern for nuclear power stations. In Japan
the companies that own aging nuclear reactors are having to compete
with newer companies that have cheaper sources of electricity and are
so seeking to cut their own costs. One way of doing this is to reduce
inspections or carry them out whilst the reactors are still
operating, which is how the workers died in the Mihama plant accident
in 2004.53 The Japanese Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center said of
the accident:
first lesson is that NISA and the Japanese power companies
don't learn lessons, certainly not ones that are likely to
cost them money. Profits are consistently given greater
priority than safety. One would expect this tendency to
be
even more pronounced in a competitive electricity market.54
Blackouts have also increased worldwide as a result of lower reserve
levels of generation capacity caused by the perverse incentives of
the market system that give greater profits to private generating
companies during times of electricity shortages. These perverse
incentives not only discourage investment in new generation capacity
but encourage withholding of electricity during times of peak demand
to send prices higher.
Privatisation often occurs as a way of reducing public debt and the
money raised from electricity asset sales is often presented as if
it is all bonus revenue for a government. However governments only
gain in the long-term if the savings in interest repayments from
reduced budget deficits, together with the tax payments from the new
private companies, exceed the lost dividends, plus the additional
costs resulting from market failures and
abuses of power
by the
private companies. This is a dubious assumption at best.
J-Power is to be privatised and will be another competitor in the
electricity generation market. The share floatation for the company,
which is 83% owned by the government and 17% owned by the GEUs, is
expected to yield $2 billion. The sale is expected to reduce Japan’s
public debt,55 although the government will also lose the profits from
the company.
Private companies, freed from social obligations, are able to
undertake profitable activities whilst the government continues to
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pay for unprofitable aspects of electricity supply like environmental
protection and equitable access. Previously governments were able to
subsidise the unprofitable activities with the profitable ones. The
inability to spread costs across a whole service means more expense
to taxpayers and savings to industry.
Nuclear power is expensive and requires government support. Nuclear
waste has to be stored or reprocessed. Reprocessed uranium is much
more expensive than conventional uranium and the GEUs ‘‘have
privately welcomed the public hostility to MOX fuel, promising
not to
introduce it against the wishes of local residents’’.56 Yet the
government has invested billions of dollars (trillions of yen) in the
project and has stockpiles of plutonium with no other use, apart from
weapons.
When bankruptcies are threatened governments have to be prepared to
step in and bail out private companies so as to secure the
electricity supply, particularly when nuclear power stations are
involved as has been seen with British Energy in the UK where the
government is paying billions of dollars to keep it going.57 Taxpayers
clearly get the worst of both worlds. They no longer reap dividends
from electricity production when it is profitable, but they still
have to pick up the bill when it is not.
The folly of relying on markets for fostering renewable energy has
been recognised in many countries with ‘liberalised’ electricity
systems and governments are again resorting to regulations to
increase renewable energy use. In California utilities are now
required by the government to meet 20 percent of their supply with
renewable sources.58 Similarly in Japan, wind and solar power are
minimal and their development depends on government support. When the
market decides on the fuel source there is no incentive to take
account of the environmental costs of that fuel source, nor does it
take account of issues that have been important to the Japanese
government such as reduced dependence on fuel imports.
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